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By international standards, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Latin America is
low – around one ﬁfth of that of the United States. Moreover, in the last ﬁve decades,
Latin America has failed to catch-up in wealth to the level of the United States while other
countries at similar or even lower stages of development have been successful. The failure
to attain higher levels of relative income represents what I call the development problem of
Latin America. Using a variety of data, I ﬁnd that the bulk of the diﬀerence in GDP per
capita between Latin America and the United States is explained by low GDP per worker
and, in particular, low total factor productivity (TFP) in Latin America. I calculate that to
explain the diﬀerence in GDP per worker, TFP in Latin America must be around 60 percent
of the level in the United States. I consider a model with heterogeneous production units
where institutions and policy distortions lead to a 60 percent productivity ratio between Latin
America and the United States. Removing the barriers to productivity can increase long-run
relative GDP per worker in Latin America by a factor of 4. This increase is equivalent to
70-years worth of U.S. post WW-II development.
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11 Introduction
The economic growth experience of Latin America in the last ﬁve decades constitutes one of
the most interesting episodes in modern development economics. In 1950, GDP per capita
in Latin America relative to the United States was 34 percent. By 2005 this statistic had
fallen to 22 percent. Not only income is low in Latin American countries, but also it has
fallen relative to the industrial leader. This poor economic performance contrasts sharply
with other regions and countries at similar or lower stages of economic development in 1950.1
While many countries in Latin America contribute to this relatively poor performance, some
countries stand out such as Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela. Broadly speaking,
the facts of low and declining relative income motivate what I call the Latin American
development problem. What explains this poor economic performance in Latin America?
Using data for 10 Latin American countries, I report the following facts about the devel-
opment problem in Latin America.2 First, between 1950 and 2005 Latin America features
low (about 1/5) and declining GDP per capita relative to the United States. Second, in
decomposing GDP per capita I ﬁnd that none of the diﬀerence is explained by diﬀerences
in the amount of work hours, while only 20 percent of the diﬀerence is explained by a lower
employment to population ratio in Latin America. The bulk of wealth diﬀerence steams from
1Duarte and Restuccia (2006) report that in 1960 the average Latin American country represented 34
percent of the GDP per worker in the United States. It also represented more than 2.4 times the GDP per
worker of the average country in Asia and about half the GDP per worker of Western Europe. By 2000, the
same Latin American countries represented about 25 percent of the GDP per worker in the United States.
Whereas Latin American countries lost some ground in productivity relative to that of the United States,
Asia overtook Latin America’s labor productivity (Latin America being 73 percent of Asia) and Western
Europe increased its advantage to more than 3 times the level of productivity in Latin America.
2The countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. See the data appendix for more details.
2low (about 1/4) GDP per worker in Latin America relative to the United States. Third, in
decomposing GDP per worker using an aggregate production function that includes physical
and human capital as inputs, I show that almost none of the diﬀerence is explained by sys-
tematic diﬀerences in the physical capital to output ratio, that some diﬀerence is explained
by diﬀerences in the quality and quantity of human capital but that all the diﬀerence steams
from diﬀerences in TFP. This emphasis on the role of TFP in explaining the economic per-
formance of Latin America is consistent with the earlier analysis of Elias (1992), Solimano
and Soto (2006), among others. I argue that in the context of a model with physical and
human capital accumulation TFP in Latin America relative to the United States need only
be about 60 percent. Fourth, I report labor productivity in agriculture, industry, and ser-
vices to argue that aggregate productivity diﬀerences between Latin America and the United
States are not the result of sector speciﬁc distortions. Therefore, I seek for an economy-wide
explanation for low productivity in Latin America.
Given these facts, I then consider a model where institutions and policy distortions in
Latin America cause relative measured TFP to be 60 percent of the United States. The
model follows Restuccia and Rogerson (2007) in extending the neoclassical growth model
to allow for plant heterogeneity. This framework has been extensively used in empirical
applications of productivity diﬀerences across countries (see for instance Hsieh and Klenow,
2007; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2006; Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk, 2007;
among others). A related framework has been used for more speciﬁc applications of the
development problem such as size-dependent policies (Guner, Ventura, and Xi, 2007), ﬁnan-
cial frictions (Greenwood et al. 2007), restrictions to foreign direct investment (Burstein
3and Monge, 2007), among others. In the model plants diﬀer on their factor productivity
and reallocation of capital and labor across plants leads to measured TFP diﬀerences. In
addition, upon entering plants invest in the likelihood of higher productivity. As a result,
institutions and policy distortions not only misallocate resources across plants, but also can
shift the distribution of plants to lower productivity levels. The class of institutions and
policy distortions that I consider is broad and abstract. I quantify the impact of institutions
that cause an increase in the cost of entry for plants. There are many examples of these
costs (see for instance De Soto, 1986 and Djankov et al. 2002). I also quantify the impact
of idiosyncratic distortions that cause a reallocation of resources from the most productive
plants to the less productive plants. The type of policies that would eﬀectively cause such
a reallocation is also very large including public enterprises, trade and labor restrictions,
taxation, competition barriers and excessive regulations, among others. In the calibrated
model, I ﬁnd that these institutions and policy distortions lead to a TFP ratio between the
distorted and undistorted economies in the range of 60 to 70 percent. As a result, remov-
ing the productivity barriers in Latin America can lead to an increase in relative long-run
labor productivity of a factor of 4. Under one metric, this increase in labor productivity is
equivalent to 70 years worth of U.S. post-WWII development.
There is an extensive literature analyzing diﬀerent aspects of the development experience
in Latin America. This literature is too vast to cite here but see for instance Solimano and
Soto (2006) and the references therein. There is also a recent literature studying country-
speciﬁc experiences using quantitative models (see for instance Bergoeing et al., 2002; Kyd-
land and Zarazaga, 2002; Cole, Ohanian, Riascos, and Schmitz, 2005; among others). Cole
4et al. (2005) emphasize the importance of competition barriers in explaining the low pro-
ductivity levels in Latin America. Many Latin American experiences have been studied in
the context of depression episodes such as Mexico and Chile in the 80’s (see for instance
Bergoeing et al., 2002, Bergoeing et al., 2004). While similar forces may lead to TFP to be
below trend, the emphasis in this paper is in explaining the low productivity levels in Latin
America.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I document the basic facts about
the development problem in Latin America. I decompose GDP per capita to show that low
labor productivity (and in particular low TFP) is at the core of the development problem in
Latin America. Section 3 describes a model of TFP and calibrates it to data for the United
States. In section 4 I perform a quantitative analysis of institutions and policy distortions
in Latin America with a discussion of policy implications. I conclude in section 5.
2 Some Facts
In this section, I document a set of facts about gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and
related factors in order to establish what I call the development problem in Latin America.
The analysis will serve to guide the search for an explanation of the development problem
in Latin America. The period of analysis covers 1950 to 2005 at an annual frequency. I will
focus on long-run trends, therefore, the data are trended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
with a smoothing parameter λ = 100. For a detailed description of the data and sources see
the Appendix.
52.1 GDP per Capita
The total amount of goods and services produced in a country within a speciﬁed period of
time provides a summary measure of wealth in a nation. Between 1950 and 2005, GDP per
capita has grown for all Latin American countries. But the growth in GDP per capita has
not allowed Latin American countries to catch up to the level of more developed economies.
I take the United States, which has observed a high level and stable growth rate of GDP
per capita for most of the 20th century, as the benchmark against which to compare the
economic performance in Latin America. Relative to the United States, GDP per capita in
Latin American countries is low and has been declining. Table 1 summarizes these facts. In
1950 Latin America was 34 percent of the GDP per capita of the United States. By 2005
this statistic has declined to 22 percent. This relative decline is highly inﬂuenced by the
negative economic performances of Venezuela, Uruguay, and Argentina. Figure 1 reports
the evolution of GDP per capita in Latin American countries relative to the United States
between 1950 and 2005. Relative GDP per capita has been stagnant or declining for Latin
American countries during this period. With the exception of Chile in recent years, no other
Latin American country has grown at rates substantially above the ones in the United States.
This occurs despite Latin American countries observing levels of GDP per capita about one
third the level in the United States in 1950. Even though there is substantial room for
catch-up in income to the United States, this process has not occurred for Latin American
countries. This performance contrasts sharply with the evolution of GDP per capita in other
countries at a similar stage of development in 1950. For instance, Italy, Spain, Hong Kong,
and Singapore were in 1950 at relative levels similar or below the average of Latin America
6(with 37, 23, 23, and 22 percent of GDP per capita of the United States respectively) and
were able to catch up substantially to the United States (to 64, 55, 81, and 91 percent in
2005).
Table 1: GDP per Capita in Latin America
Relative GDP Annualized Growth
per capita GDP per capita
Country 1950 2005 1950-2005 (%)
Argentina 0.49 0.27 0.97
Bolivia 0.20 0.09 0.59
Brazil 0.17 0.19 2.28
Chile 0.38 0.38 2.08
Colombia 0.22 0.18 1.73
Ecuador 0.19 0.15 1.62
Mexico 0.24 0.25 2.14
Peru 0.24 0.14 1.03
Uruguay 0.50 0.25 0.79
Venezuela 0.77 0.27 0.12
Latin America 0.34 0.22 –
USA 1.0 1.0 2.08
2.2 Decomposing GDP per Capita
What is the source of the poor economic performance of Latin American economies? We can
look beyond the aggregate evolution of GDP per capita and decompose it into three factors










7where Y/P is GDP per capita, E/P is the employment to population ratio, n is hours per
worker, and Y/nE is labor productivity (GDP per labor hour). Hence, the ratio of GDP per













In words, relative GDP per capita between countries i and j is the product of the ratio of labor
productivity, the ratio of employment to population, and the ratio of hours worked. Hence,
a low relative GDP per capita can be the result of low labor productivity, low employment
rates, low hours or any combination of these factors. The evidence from Figure 1 indicates
that the factor diﬀerence in GDP per capita between Latin America and the United States is
roughly 1 to 5 (or 20 percent). Which variables in the above decomposition explain a factor
of 5 times diﬀerence between GDP per capita in the United States and Latin America? I
describe these diﬀerences in turn.
Hours I ﬁrst examine whether hours of work can account for the low relative levels of GDP
per capita in Latin America. There are important limitations in collecting and comparing
hours of work across a wide range of countries. Nevertheless the available data suggest that
hours of work cannot explain the low relative levels of GDP per capita in Latin America.
I use data on annual hours per worker collected by the Conference Board and Groningen
Growth and Development Centre (2007) from a number of sources. Figure 2 documents the
available time series data for a number of Latin American economies and the United States.
As the ﬁgure shows, Latin American countries systematically work more hours than the
8United States (about 8 percent more in average). Over time, with the exception of Mexico,
hours of work have declined for all countries but hours of work remain in about 8 percent
higher for Latin American countries relative to the United States. As a result, not only
aggregate hours contributes to a small diﬀerence between Latin America and the United
States, but also hours of work contributes negatively to explaining low relative GDP per
capita in Latin America. I conclude then that an explanation of low and declining relative
GDP per capita in Latin America cannot be based on diﬀerences in hours of work.
Employment to Population Ratio I next examine whether diﬀerences in the employ-
ment to population ratio can explain the low relative GDP per capita in Latin America.
Figure 3 documents the time series for the employment to population ratio across Latin
American countries and the United States. While there are some patterns over time that
relate to the increasing participation of women in the labor market for all countries (most
noticeably for the United States) and while the employment ratio is higher for the United
States than most Latin American countries, the diﬀerence in the employment ratio can only
explain less than 20 percent of the diﬀerence in GDP per capita across Latin America and
the United States. To see this, notice that the ratio of the employment to population be-
tween Latin America and the United States is 0.75 while the ratio of GDP per capita is 0.20,
therefore the employment ratio explains less than 20 percent of the diﬀerence in GDP per
capita (log(0.75)/log(0.20)).
Labor Productivity The previous analysis leaves us with one factor explaining the bulk
diﬀerences in GDP per capita. That factor is labor productivity or GDP per labor hour.
9Since I already established that hours diﬀerences are small and stable then the bulk of
diﬀerence in GDP per capita is explained by diﬀerences in GDP per worker between Latin
American countries and the United States. Figure 4 reports GDP per worker for Latin
America relative to the United States. A simple inspection of Figure 4 together with Figure
1 suggests that indeed the level diﬀerences and time path of GDP per capita are well captured
by the behavior of GDP per worker. As a summary measure, the average ratio of GDP per
worker between Latin America and the United States is 0.25, this explains 86 percent of the
diﬀerence in GDP per capita (log(0.25)/log(0.20)).
To summarize, the average diﬀerence in GDP per capita between Latin America and the
United States is accounted for by
(Y/P)LA















Hence, the contribution to the diﬀerence in GDP per capita between Latin America and the
United States is: labor productivity 87 percent, employment ratio 18 percent, and hours -5
percent.
2.3 Decomposing GDP per Worker
To investigate the sources of diﬀerences in GDP per worker the standard procedure is to
write down an aggregate production function that explicitly states the relevant factors of
production. For this purpose, I consider a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregate production




where Y is output, K and H are the inputs of physical and human capital services, and A is
total factor productivity (TFP). Since ultimately I am interested in broadly separating the
importance of factor accumulation (human and physical capital) and TFP, I follow Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) in writing the production function above in intensive form. To
do this, ﬁrst I write aggregate human capital (H) as the product of human capital per worker
(h) and the number of workers (E), i.e., H = Eh. Using this substitution in equation (1),

































In words, GDP per worker diﬀerences can be the result of three factors: diﬀerences in TFP,
diﬀerences in physical capital to output, and diﬀerences in human capital per worker. The
goal is to investigate the factors on the right hand side of equation (3) that can account for
diﬀerences in GDP per worker of 1 to 4 between Latin America and the United States.
11Physical Capital I ﬁrst investigate the importance of physical capital accumulation. I
focus on institutions and policies that lead to capital to output ratio diﬀerences across
countries. Notice that diﬀerences in TFP could also cause capital accumulation to diﬀer
across countries. But in a broad class of models, FP diﬀerences imply no diﬀerences in the
capital to output ratio. This implication is what leads to the decomposition in equation
(2) to be useful in separating the forces directly related to capital accumulation from TFP
diﬀerences. So the next step is to look for measures of physical capital across countries.
Typically the physical capital stock is measured in domestic prices. Cole et al. (2005) and
others have used this measure from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) in their analysis. In these
units the physical capital stock relative to GDP is not systematically diﬀerent across Latin
American countries and the United States (see Figure 5). However, measuring the capital
stock at domestic prices may give a biased view of capital accumulation since the price of
capital goods is systematically higher in poor relative to rich countries (see for instance
Restuccia and Urrutia, 2001). Alternatively, a measure of the capital stock at common
international prices can be constructed using investment rates from the Penn World Table. I
follow this approach in constructing the capital to output ratio for Latin American countries
and the United States (see the Appendix for details). I report these estimates in Figure 6
and Table 2, and the time series of the investment rates from PWT6.1 in Figure 7. The main
conclusion I draw from these ﬁgures is that capital accumulation as measured by the capital
to output ratio is not systematically diﬀerent between Latin America and the United States.
In fact, in 1960 the average capital to output ratio in Latin America was 20 percent above
the level in the United States, whereas in 2000 the capital to output ratio was 80 percent of
12the level in the United States. Nevertheless, these level diﬀerences are too small to account
for any substantial portion of the diﬀerence in GDP per worker across these countries. For
instance, with a capital share of 1/3 (α = 1/3 in equation (3), a 30 percent higher capital to
output ratio translates into a 14 percent higher GDP per worker. I conclude that although
there are some relevant country diﬀerences in the capital to output ratio, these diﬀerences
are not systematic and quantitatively substantial to explain diﬀerences in GDP per worker
of a factor of 4 between Latin American countries and the United States.













Latin America 2.09 1.71
USA 1.69 2.14
Human Capital A serious limitation of development accounting studies is the fact that
there are no good measures of human capital across countries. In addition, even if these
measures were available, it would be diﬃcult to disentangle the role of TFP and other
factors in explaining those diﬀerences. For this reason, recent studies have used quantitative
theory to get at the importance of human capital in development – see for instance Manuelli
13and Seshadri (2006) and Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2007). There is some available
evidence on the quantity of schooling indicating important diﬀerences across countries (see
Figure 8) but a theory is needed to assess the importance of those diﬀerences in human
capital and output across countries. How do productivity diﬀerences translate into human
capital diﬀerences across countries? Standard models of human capital accumulation imply
a log linear relationship between human capital and income when economies diﬀer on TFP,
i.e.,
logh = ch + γ log(Y/E),
where h is human capital per worker, Y/E is output per worker, and ch is a constant.
Substituting this expression for h in equation (2) and ignoring diﬀerences in the physical







where cy is a constant. Using equation (4), GDP per worker between countries i and j is










Diﬀerences in TFP across countries lead to diﬀerences in physical capital accumulation and
human capital accumulation (both in the form of quantity of schooling – years – and on the
quality of schooling). These factors can lead to a substantial ampliﬁcation of TFP diﬀerences
14across countries. To see how important this mechanism can be, ﬁrst suppose in equation
(5) that γ = 0 and α = 1/3 consistent with the standard one-sector growth model. Then in
order to generate a factor of 4 diﬀerence in GDP per worker between the United States and
Latin America, a TFP ratio of 2.5 is needed – TFP in the United States would need to be 2.5
times that of Latin America. This number is perhaps too large to be justiﬁed empirically.
But if instead γ = 1/2, equation (5) would require a TFP ratio of 1.6 in order to achieve
a factor of 4 diﬀerence in output per worker. The key question is then how important this
ampliﬁcation mechanism is quantitatively. Or to put it diﬀerently, what is a reasonable value
for the elasticity parameter summarized by γ?
Total Factor Productivity The relationship implied by equation (5) can be used to
establish the diﬀerence in TFP between Latin America and the United States that is needed
in order to explain a diﬀerence in GDP per worker of 1 to 4. Using cross-section heterogeneity
across people in the United States, Erosa, et al. (2007) estimate that γ is around 0.46.3
Given this estimated value for γ, equation (5) implies that in order to generate a factor of 4
diﬀerences in GDP per worker between the United States and Latin America, TFP must be
60 percent higher in the United States. In the next section I consider a theory of TFP that
can potentially explain a productivity diﬀerence of this magnitude between Latin America
and the United States.
3Roughly speaking, the parameters of the human capital production function that generate an elasticity
of TFP on income across countries also generate an elasticity of heterogeneity across people and their
earnings. So cross-section heterogeneity within a country gives some information on the relevant cross-
country elasticity.
152.4 Sectoral Labor Productivity
Before I move on to the theory, one last point about the data. An argument could be made
about Latin America aﬀecting productivity in speciﬁc sectors or distorting activity that af-
fects some sectors of the economy more than others. This view of the development problem
in Latin America is not consistent with the facts. The evidence from three broad sectors
–agriculture, industry, and services– shows that low labor productivity growth relative to
the United States is prevalent in all the sectors of the economy. For a summary of these
facts see Figures 9, 10, and 11. See also Duarte and Restuccia (2007b) for a more detailed
documentation of the data sources and modeling assumptions related to these ﬁgures. I con-
clude that low labor productivity in Latin America is not the result of sector speciﬁc policies
or distortions, instead it is an economy-wide phenomenon. All countries go through a pro-
cess of structural transformation whereby the agricultural sector is replaced in importance
by the industrial sector and later by the service sector. While labor productivity improve-
ments in agriculture and specially industry have proven essential in explaining episodes of
substantial catch-up in aggregate productivity between new industrialized countries and the
United States such as Korea, Japan, Singapore, and many European countries, sectoral labor
productivity in Latin America has failed to catch up in all sectors.4
4See for instance Duarte and Restuccia (2007a) and (2007b).
163 A Theory of TFP
I present an extension of a theory of measured total factor productivity developed by Restuc-
cia and Rogerson (2007). The theory builds from the industry equilibrium framework of
Hopenhayn (1992) embedded into a standard neoclassical growth model. The basic ingredi-
ent of the theory is the heterogeneity in total factor productivity across establishments. In
the context of this model, the allocation of factors of production across plants leads to a role
of policy distortions on aggregate measured TFP diﬀerences across countries. I now go onto
the details of the model.
3.1 Economic Environment
There is an inﬁnitely-lived representative household with preferences over streams of con-





where Ct is consumption at date t and 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. Households are
endowed with one unit of productive time in each period and K0 > 0 units of the capital
stock at date 0.
Diﬀerently than in the standard neoclassical growth model, the unit of production is the
plant. Each plant is described by a decreasing returns-to-scale production function
f(s,k,n) = sk
αn
γ, α,γ ∈ (0,1), 0 < γ + α < 1.
17with capital services k and labor services n as factor inputs. The technology parameter s
varies across plants. I assume that s can take on a discrete and ﬁnite number of values,
s ∈ S ≡ {s1,...,sns}. As in Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), I abstract from variation in s
over time. All plants face an exogenous and constant probability of death λ. Exogenous exit
realizations are iid across plants and across time.
New plants pay a set-up cost of ce measured in terms of output. After paying this cost a
realization of the plant-level productivity parameter s is drawn but plants can invest in the
likelihood of higher realizations of productivity levels. In particular, incurring the cost c(q)
in units of output, with probability q productivity is drawn from the higher productivity set
SH ≡ {snˆ s+1,...,sns} according to a pdf hH(s), while with probability 1 − q productivity is
drawn from the lower set SL ≡ {s1,...,snˆ s} according to pdf hL(s), where nˆ s ∈ {1,...,ns}.
Draws are iid across entrants and there is a continuum of potential entrants. I denote by Nt
the mass of entry in period t. I parameterize the cost function as
c(q) = Bq
φ, B,φ > 0.
Feasibility in this model requires:
Ct + Xt + ceNt + c(qt)Nt ≤ Yt,
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Xt is aggregate investment in physical capital, c(qt) is
the investment cost in plant quality, Nt is aggregate entry, and Yt is aggregate output. As in
18the standard neoclassical growth model, the aggregate law of motion for capital is given by:
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Xt.
I focus on institutions and policies that create idiosyncratic distortions to plant-level
decisions as emphasized in Restuccia and Rogerson (2007). The empirical counterpart of
these policies will be discussed later. Broadly speaking these policies will be represented by
a tax on output of operating plants τ. As in Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), I assume that
τ can take on three values: a positive value reﬂecting that a plant is being taxed, a negative
value reﬂecting that the plant is being subsidized, and zero reﬂecting no distortion for the
plant. Diﬀerent speciﬁcations of policy are denoted by P(s,τ) representing the probability
that a plant with productivity s faces policy τ and it is possible that the value of the plant-
level tax rate be correlated with the draw of the plant-level productivity parameter. From
the point of view of the plant what matters is the joint probability distribution over s and
τ and I denote this by gH(s,τ) and gL(s,τ) for productivity in the high and low sets. Not
all policy conﬁgurations will lead to a balanced budget for the government so I assume that
the government imposes a lump-sum tax (or transfer) T to consumers in order to balance
the budget.
3.2 Equilibrium
The analysis focuses exclusively on the steady-state competitive equilibrium of the model.
In a steady-state equilibrium the rental prices for labor and capital services are constant as
19well as all aggregates in the economy including the invariant distribution of plants in the
economy. The consumer’s side of the model is entirely standard so I will skip the details.
The important aspect to keep in mind from the consumer’s problem is that the real interest
rate in the economy is pinned down by preference parameters and the depreciation rate of
the capital stock, i.e., in steady state the real interest rate, denoted by R, is given by




Incumbent Plant’s Problem The decision problem of a plant to hire capital and labor





γ − wn − rk}.
It is simple to derive the optimal factor demands from this problem which I denote ¯ k and ¯ n.
Because both the plant-level productivity and tax rate are constant over time, the discounted





where ρ = 1−λ
1+R is the discount rate for the plant, R is the (steady-state) real interest rate,
and λ is the exogenous exit rate.
20Entering Plant’s Problem Conditional upon entering, a plant invests c(q) in plant pro-
ductivity. This investment leads to a probability q of drawing plant productivity from the
set SH. I denote the optimal investment decision by ¯ q. Potential entering plants make their
entry decision knowing that they face a distribution over potential draws for the pair (s,τ).













Whether a potential entering plant decides to enter or not depends on the expected value
of entering We being greater than zero. In an equilibrium with entry, We must be equal to
zero since otherwise additional plants would enter. This condition is typically referred to as
the free-entry condition.
Deﬁnition of Equilibrium A steady-state competitive equilibrium with entry is a wage
rate w, a rental rate r, a lump-sum tax T, an aggregate distribution of plants µ(s,τ), a
mass of entry N, value functions W(s,τ), π(s,τ), We, policy functions ¯ k(s,τ), ¯ n(s,τ), ¯ q for
individual plants, and aggregate levels of consumption (C) and capital (K) such that:
(i) (Consumer optimization) r = 1/β − (1 − δ),
(ii) (Plant optimization) Given prices (w,r), the functions π, W, and We solve incumbent
and entering plant’s problems and ¯ k, ¯ n, ¯ q are optimal policy functions,










C + δK + ceN + c(¯ q)N =
X
s,τ
f(s,¯ k, ¯ n)µ(s,τ),




τf(s,¯ k, ¯ n)µ(s,τ) = 0,






λ ¯ qgH(s,τ), ∀s ∈ SH,∀τ,
N
λ (1 − ¯ q)gL(s,τ), ∀s ∈ SL,∀τ.
3.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model to data for the United States assuming that this is an economy with
no distortions. The general strategy follows Cooley and Prescott (1995) in calibrating the
neoclassical growth model. A period in the model corresponds to one year in the data. The
discount factor is selected to match a real rate of return of 4 percent, implying β = 0.96. The
parameter controlling decreasing returns to scale at the plant is quantitatively important.
I assume α + γ = 0.85. Recent related studies have argued for values around this level, in
particular, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) using manufacturing data. But others using diﬀerent
22calibration procedures and emprical strategies have arrived to similar values (see for instance
Veracierto, 2001; Basu and Fernald, 1997; and Atkeson, Khan, and Ohanian, 1996). For more
discussion on the implications of this choice see Restuccia and Rogerson (2007). Given this
value, I separate α and γ according to the income share of capital and labor (1/3 and 2/3),
hence α = 0.28 and γ = 0.57. The depreciation rate of capital δ is chosen so that the capital
to output ratio is equal to 2, implying δ = 0.10. The exit rate λ is assumed to be 10 percent
consistent with the evidence of job destruction rates in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)
and exit rates of plants in Tybout (2000).
In the economy with no distortions there is a simple mapping between plant-level pro-
ductivity and employment. So I choose the range of productivity to match the range of
employment levels in the data. With the lowest plant productivity normalized to one, this
calibration implies that the highest productivity is 3.78. I use a log-spaced grid of plant
productivity with 100 points, i.e., ns = 100. The next step is to restrict the probability
distributions. I choose nˆ s to be 20 percent of ns. With the calibrated distributions this
implies that plants in the set SL represent close to 40 percent of all plants. The mapping
of productivity to employment implies that I can choose values of [qhH(s),(1 − q)hL(s)] to
match the distribution of plants across employment sizes. This puts a restriction on the
values of q and hH(s) and hL(s). For the cost function c(q), I set φ = 2 and then choose B
so that the equilibrium ¯ q = 0.615 which is the value implied by the U.S. plant data. I use
statistics from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1997), Census of Manufactures in order
to restrict these distribution. An important property of the U.S. plant data is that there is
a large number of plants with a small number of workers and therefore these plants account
23Table 3: Distribution of Plants and Employment
Share of (%)
Establishments Employment
Workers Data Model Data Model
Less than 10 51.4 51.4 4.0 3.8
Between 10 and 50 31.2 31.2 15.2 13.6
Between 50 and 500 16.0 16.0 48.3 43.8
More than 500 1.4 1.4 32.5 38.8
for a small share of the employment in the economy. About 50 percent of the plants have
less than 10 workers and these plants account for only 4 percent of the employment, while
only half of a percent of plants have more than 2,500 workers and represent 30 percent of the
employment. Table 3 reports these statistics from the data and the calibrated economy. As
the table shows, the calibrated economy matches the distribution statistics very well. Table
4 summarizes the parameter values and targets for the calibrated economy.
Table 4: Calibration
Parameter Value Target
α 0.28 Capital income share
γ 0.57 Labor income share
β 0.96 Real rate of return
δ 0.10 Capital to output ratio
ce 1.0 Normalization
λ 0.1 Annual exit rate
{s1,...,sns}, hH(s), hL(s) see text Size distribution of plants
nˆ s 20 –
φ 2 Baseline
B 2.4 q = 0.615
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I study three types of experiments in the model. First, I consider a modiﬁcation of the
benchmark economy to allow for an increase in the cost of entry of plants ce. This higher
cost of entry is motivated by a variety of evidence for Latin American economies. Second,
I consider policies that distort the prices faced by diﬀerent producers, what Restuccia and
Rogerson (2007) call idiosyncratic distortions. In particular, I evaluate a policy conﬁguration
where the output of the 50 percent most productive plants gets taxed at the rate of 10
percent and the remaining 50 percent of plants get subsidized. I choose the subsidy rate to
maintain capital accumulation as in the benchmark economy. Third, I compute equilibrium
for an economy that features the previous two scenarios – a higher entry cost and policy
distortions. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of these experiments. All statistics (except
distributional statistics) are reported relative to the benchmark economy without distortions
and with the normalized entry cost of 1.
Entry Costs Higher entry costs discourage plants entering the market (see column 2 in
Table 5). This reduces productivity compared to the benchmark economy because plant
sizes are distorted. With the higher entry cost the average plant has more workers than in
the benchmark economy. The aggregate eﬀect of the higher entry cost is not large, it reduces
output per worker in about 5 percent compared to the benchmark economy. The eﬀect of
the higher entry cost on average establishment size is somewhat mitigated by the fact that
the lower wage rate encourages more investment in plant productivity, so q in this economy
is 76 percent as compared to 61.5 percent in the benchmark economy.
25Table 5: Aggregate Implications
B.E. Experiments
ce = 1 ce = 1.5 ce = 1 ce = 1.5
Variable τ = 0 τ = 0 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.1
Relative Y 1.00 0.95 0.69 0.60
Relative TFP 1.00 0.96 0.69 0.61
Relative E 1.00 0.62 1.85 1.19
Relative w 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.95
q 0.62 0.76 0.11 0.08
Idiosyncratic Distortions I now implement a set of policies that create diﬀerences in the
output prices of diﬀerent producers. Many policies take eﬀectively this form and Restuccia
and Rogerson (2007) study a general conﬁguration of these policies. I set the tax rate to
10 percent and then compute the subsidy rate that leaves capital accumulation the same.
Holding capital accumulation constant is motivated by the observations discussed above
that capital accumulation is not a fundamental factor in explaining low relative GDP per
worker in Latin America. The eﬀect on output per worker is larger for this policy (see
Table 5 column 3). Output falls by more than 30 percent. This is mainly the result of a
systematic distortion on plants – productive plants become small because of the tax on output
while unproductive plants become larger because of the subsidy. This distortion entails a
misallocation of resources across plants with diﬀerent productivity. In addition, the policy
leads to decrease in investment in plant productivity so q falls to 11 percent compared to 61.5
percent in the benchmark economy. This shifts the distribution of plants by employment size
to the left, reducing the average establishment size in more than 40 percent. This eﬀect on the
average establishment size is consistent with the evidence in Tybout (2000) that production
26Table 6: Distributional Implications
B.E. Experiments
ce = 1 ce = 1.5 ce = 1 ce = 1.5
Variable τ = 0 τ = 0 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.1
Relative Y 1.00 0.95 0.69 0.60
Share of Establishments:
<10 0.51 0.32 0.50 0.50
10 to 49 0.31 0.41 0.26 0.03
50 to 499 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.47
≥ 500 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Share of Employment:
<10 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03
10 to 49 0.14 0.11 0.35 0.02
50 to 499 0.44 0.41 0.57 0.92
≥ 500 0.38 0.46 0.04 0.03
in developing countries takes place in smaller units (see Table 6). When combined with
higher entry costs, policy distortions create a fall in output per worker and productivity of
almost 40 percent (see Table 5 column 4). This is the magnitude in productivity that is
needed to generate an output per worker diﬀerence between Latin America and the United
States when capital accumulation is augmented to include human capital.
Discussion While the policy experiments considered above are simpliﬁed and abstract,
they capture the essence of the empirical evidence on the cost of doing business in Latin
America relative to developed countries and the systematic bias against large and productive
establishments. I brieﬂy discuss some of this evidence. There is abundant evidence on the
higher cost of doing business in Latin America. The most well-known empirical cases are
De Soto (1986) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2002). For instance,
according to the data on barriers to entry in Djankov et al. (2002), Latin American countries




Argentina, Colombia ≈ 35
Brazil 45




have a cost of entry for ﬁrms – a measure of cost of entry (time and goods) relative to per
capita GDP – that ranges between 20 to 300 percent. These costs represent less than 2
percent in developed economies. (See some of these ﬁgures in Table 7.) More recently, the
World Bank has collected systematic data for a large number of countries ranking them in
categories such as starting a business, dealing with licences, protecting investors, enforcing
contracts, trade and other restrictions. The data is reported every year, the most recent being
Doing Business 2008 (see World Bank, 2008). Not surprisingly, Latin American economies
rank at the bottom on most of these measures. (See also Fantoni, 2007). Broader measures
of regulation and their eﬀect on economic performance have been constructed and analyzed
by Loayza, Oviedo, and Serven (2007). Again these indices indicate that Latin America
has an overly regulated economy, many of these restriction impose higher costs of operating
a business but many of them become a de facto tax on large and productive ﬁrms. For
instance, Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2007) document the empirical evidence from
developing countries that ﬁnancial reforms aﬀect the allocation of investment, leading to
higher productivity.
285 Conclusions
In this paper I make two main points. First, I show that low and declining GDP per capita
in Latin America relative to the United States (what I call the development problem of
Latin America) is due to low and declining relative total factor productivity. In other words,
the development problem of Latin America is a productivity problem. I calculate that in
order to explain a factor of 1 to 4 diﬀerence in GDP per worker between Latin America
and the United States only a 1 to 1.6 diﬀerence in TFP would be needed. The larger
diﬀerence in GDP per worker arises as an ampliﬁcation of productivity through physical and
human capital accumulation. Second, I consider a framework where institutions and policy
distortions create a misallocation of factors across heterogeneous producers that explains the
low relative productivity in Latin America. Barriers to formal market entry, regulation and
barriers to competition, trade barriers and employment protection, among others may be at
the core of productivity diﬀerences between Latin America and the United States. Removing
these barriers can lead to an increase in long-run relative GDP per worker in Latin America
of a factor of 4. This increase in income amounts to 70 years worth of U.S. post-WWII
development.
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33A Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
The data covers 10 Latin American countries. These are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For most countries the time
series include data from 1950 to 2005. The main source of data is the Conference Board and
Groningen Growth Centre (2007).
I use data from Penn World Tables version 6.1. (see Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002)
to construct annual time series of PPP-adjusted investment to GDP ratio. This series cover
the period 1950 to 2003 for all countries. I use the investment rates at international prices
to obtain a measure of physical capital to output ratio (K/Y )at international prices. I
proceed as follows: (1) Estimate K/Y in 1954 using the average I/Y from PWT 1950-54
and the steady-state relationship implied by a standard Solow model, i.e., K/Y =
I/Y
(n+g+δ+ng)
where n is the growth rate of population, g is the growth rate of productivity, and δ is the
depreciation rate of capital. I assume δ2 ≡ n + g + ng + δ = 0.10. (2) Use I/Y to compute
K/Y over time using the standard capital accumulation equation Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It.
This implies,
Kt+1






where ˆ g is the gross growth rate of output (growth
in output per capita times population growth).
The physical capital stock in domestic prices is from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993).
The sectoral data is from Duarte and Restuccia (2006) for details see the appendix.
Data on years of schooling is from Cohen and Soto (2007) (see also Barro and Lee, 2000).
All series are trended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter λ =
100 before any ratios are computed.















































35Figure 2: Annual Hours per Worker


















36Figure 3: Employment to Population Ratio




































































38Figure 5: Physical Capital to GDP Ratio (Domestic Prices)






















39Figure 6: Physical Capital to GDP Ratio (International Prices)






















40Figure 7: Investment to GDP Ratio























41Figure 8: Average Years of Schooling





















42Figure 9: Value Added per Worker – Agriculture
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43Figure 10: Value Added per Worker – Industry
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44Figure 11: Value Added per Worker – Services
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